MS. KELLEY: The only comment is page 70 of the JDPL.

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3 MR. HARTHUN: I believe I have a copy of it. 4

Walking through the AT&T proposed language which I find at Section 24.0, et sec, the most important aspect of what's missing in the AT&T language is the equivalent of our Section 19.2, 9 which provides for indemnification from third-party 10 losses with respect to breaches of this 11 Interconnection Agreement.

I believe their Section 24.1 and our 19.1 13 addressed basically the same issue, and I think we 14 pointed that out in our rebuttal testimony. 15∥of the process in Section 19.3, and I say "process" 16 to mean in the event of indemnification, who is responsible for counsel, who is responsible for 18 | handling the case, that kind of stuff, in large 19∥part is similar for the first three or four subsections of their process.

At the end of the AT&T language, however, Verizon would require WorldCom or AT&T to modify

1∥its end-user tariffs, which WorldCom believes is 2 | inappropriate, for purposes of an Interconnection 3 Agreement.

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One last point, on the last section, their 5 24.6, WorldCom finds it to be ambiguous and 6 confusing. There are several things going on there 7 with several conditions, and it's not clear exactly 8 how that indemnification would apply, I believe, in a line-sharing context, but part of that is unclear 10 as well.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: With the exception of the two provisions which you just mentioned, would you otherwise be accepting of the Verizon/AT&T language?

> MR. HARTHUN: Could you give me a second. (Pause.)

MR. HARTHUN: Just walking through these in order, their 24.1, while it largely addresses the same issue, it caps or restricts indemnification to negligent and otherwise tortious acts which is very different from ours, so for that reason I cannot accept it. It, of course,

missing our 19.2, which I already stated.

I believe their 24.2 would be acceptable, \mid and then in the process 24.3-A, B, C, D, and E would be acceptable. However, for the reasons I stated, 24.4, 24.5, and 24.6 would not be acceptable.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: Thank you. I don't know if this is worth exploring now, but if Verizon just quickly explained whether or not those provisions 10 | that would be in dispute are of primary importance to it.

> MR. ANTONIOU: Yes.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: Thank you. Let's move on. Let's move on to issue V-11, which is another indemnification provision.

My main question with regard to V-11--

MR. DYGERT: Hold on a second.

MR. ANTONIOU: We settled that.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: Wonderful.

It's not settled with MS. KELLEY:

21 WorldCom.

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MR. FIRSCHEIN: V-11 is still open with

1 | regard to WorldCom?

MR. ANTONIOU: I think so.

> That's my understanding, MR. HARTHUN:

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MR. FIRSCHEIN: I would like a quick clarification on this issue. From the testimony we received and also the joint DPL, it's unclear to me under this provision which party would be 9 indemnifying the other party. It seems the other 10 parties had that mixed up in a couple of cases.

MR. ANTONIOU: I think there are two 12 | indemnifications. What we agreed to with AT&T and would also like to agree with WorldCom is to the 14 extent of gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of Verizon in taking--listing information 16∥as provided to us which is to say listing information itself is correct, we get it, we have an instance of either gross negligence or willful 19 misconduct.

To the extent that WorldCom--and again, this is the same language with AT&T--has 22∥substantively identical limitations of liability

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1 provisions in their contracts and tariffs, then Verizon will, in fact, indemnify in those instances 3 | third-party claims, WorldCom's end user customer that might say, "My goodness, look how they spelled my name here. This is horrible. It's going to cost me money." That's the indemnification that the CLEC is questioning.

And as far as the other way around, if we obtain listing information that has certain words, we print them exactly as given, make no mistakes in doing our work, nonetheless the customer of the CLEC files a claim against us and says, "I don't like what was printed there, " as long as we have not made the mistake, we would like to be 15 | indemnified. We take that which was given to us and did exactly what we were asked to do.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: If I understand you correctly, it sounds as though what you're proposing for this indemnification provision would be reciprocal; would that be the way you describe it?

MR. ANTONIOU: Not quite, because we are

1 doing the listing work. We are not asking WorldCom 2 to indemnify us where they had willful misconduct or gross negligence because they're not publishing the listing. It's reciprocal only in the sense that if we do exactly what they tell us to do, we should not be in a position of having a claim against us.

> MR. FIRSCHEIN: Okav.

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MR. ANTONIOU: To the extent to which there is any sort of review of what the standard is, we are the ones doing the work here as far as the listing. We couldn't agree to a negligence standard, but the higher standard, the gross negligence or willful misconduct, we in fact agreed with AT&T in this limited instance in dealing with listings, and we would like to do that with WorldCom, if at all possible.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: If WorldCom could just briefly explain or set forth the section of that provision which it disagrees with.

MR. HARTHUN: I'm not sure what section you're referring to.

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To answer your earlier question that Chris was responding to, we are looking for reciprocal indemnification. There is no specific language on issue V-11 that we are looking for because the language is encompassed in our Section 19.2. to boil this down to the example, if WorldCom were to provide Verizon with inaccurate information with respect to a listing, that would be a breach of the Interconnection Agreement. If Verizon received a loss or third-party claim, we would indemnify them for that because we caused that harm.

We would ask the reciprocal be true, too. 13 | If we provide them an accurate listing and it somehow does not end up in the book properly due to Verizon's dealings or actions, that they would indemnify us from the same customer whose listing was misrepresented.

But again, that language is part and parcel for 19.2, and it is reciprocal.

MR. ANTONIOU: I think it's important to say that what WorldCom is requesting here is perfect performance. Our end-user customers that 1 receive listings for this example or any service, to the extent to which there is some sort of change to the normal practice, the normal practice being if there is a mistake, then the remedy is the value of the service that was affected. If they are going to pay a hundred dollars for the listings and we made a mistake, we are not going to pay the hundred dollars. That's the standard for the services and retail end-user customers.

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To the extent to which there is an exception, and it varies as I understand it from state to state, there would be in some states no exception, and in some states only for wilful misconduct, and some states wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

What WorldCom is requesting is if we make a mistake, period, if there is a claim, we must compensate them for it. For example, if there were 999 hotcuts exactly on time, perfectly done, on the thousandth one, we missed it so we had to do it three days later and meantime the business didn't have that phone line connected, we lost \$50,000

1 worth of contracts, we made a mistake, it's true 2 with the thousandth hotcut. They want \$50,000 from 3 us contractually.

Alternatively, if we have 95 percent of customers--alternatively, for our end-user customers, the analog would be providing them new service.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: I understand the example. Just one word answer from WorldCom. Was that an accurate assessment of your position?

> MR. HARTHUN: No.

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MR. FIRSCHEIN: All right. Could you explain briefly.

MR. HARTHUN: What we are asking from 15 Verizon is for them to live up to their commitments 16 | in this Interconnection Agreement, and I would point out that Verizon in other areas asked us to do exactly the same. In the resale attachment, they asked us to indemnify for them for losses with respect to customers that turn out to be ineliqible 21 for lifeline linkup services, and they expect a hundred percent performance from us on that, and we

1 plan to deliver it.

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MR. FIRSCHEIN: Okay. Let's move on now to issue VI-1(N).

MR. DYGERT: Let's do IV-01-13, negotiations prompted by change in law.

MR. THAGGART: Hello, I'm Henry Thaggart, attorney-advisor at the Policy Division. My first question is for the WorldCom panel.

WorldCom, is it your position that the same process should apply for negotiations regardless of whether the change in law increases or decreases Verizon's obligations?

MR. HARTHUN: Yes, that seems equitable.

MR. THAGGART: With respect to a change in services, Verizon, what stopgap measures does
WorldCom have at its disposal in the
Interconnection Agreement to challenge a Verizon interpretation of a change in law?

MR. ANTONIOU: Mr. Thaggart, you mean in the current proposal we have on the table?

MR. THAGGART: Yes, sir.

MR. ANTONIOU: What Verizon has proposed

1 is if it believes there has been a change in law 2∥that says, for example, we don't have to provide any longer a particular UNE, and in that case if we decide we are no longer going to provide a UNE, which is likely, we would give notice, written notice, to WorldCom under the notice provisions of the contract. So, if we provided that notice January 1st of this coming year, we could not, in fact, do anything about that. In fact, stop providing the service for at least 45 days after that, middle of February.

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In the meantime, from the date that WorldCom got the notice January 1st, they would have an immediate right, notwithstanding anything else in the contract about dispute resolution, to go directly to the Commission or other appropriate governmental body and say we don't agree, we think Verizon is wrong here, and please do not permit them to do that.

In fact, our contract envisages that Verizon understood we could request that. This is not some sort of unusual remedy. If they have the

1 facts right, if we have done something wrong here,
2 my belief is they would obtain that.

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Alternatively, if we have our ducks in a row, our facts are straight, that we can stop providing the service, which we better do. It's a big deal to stop doing that, stop providing the service, then the Commission or the court would look at those facts as explained by WorldCom and we would hope disagree and say no, we are not going to have a remedy here that they have to continue to provide the service.

MR. THAGGART: Sir, I understand your answer to be referring to stopping or terminating of a service.

What if there is a modification of the service or the change in law impacts something other than the service? For example, timing or conditions or pricing conditions. Are you saying the same 45-day negotiation period applies across the board to all changes in law?

MR. ANTONIOU: The language--I don't have it in front of me. My recollection is, as you

1 describe it, to cease providing the service. 2 believe that it would also apply in the case of materially modifying how it is that we provide the service. So, I think I answered part of your question.

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MR. THAGGART: Let me rephrase the question. I'm simply trying to understand whether your proposal here specifically is related to UNEs or is the proposal related to all changes in law that materially affect the contract?

MR. ANTONIOU: Certainly would apply to UNEs, and that's the one I had most in my mind to 13 be sure.

Another example, although it's a little 15∥bit water under the bridge, and it's already 16 occurred, is the intercarrier comp where the benefit we had to provide was the reciprocal compensation and the changes. We still have to make some payment, different payment structure and 20 different regime. So, the benefit of reciprocal compensation would apply, and it would apply to co-location, for example.

MR. THAGGART: This 45-day measure applies to all material changes?

MR. ANTONIOU: I think that's right.

MR. THAGGART: For briefing purposes, when you file a brief, WorldCom and Verizon, would you please provide details, if there are details, on what change-in-law provisions you all use in other states. And also, WorldCom, would you please respond to the proposed 45-day negotiation period for all material changes in contracts.

MR. ANTONIOU: Could I ask for clarification, when you say that we used, you mean between we two parties or other contracts with other parties as well?

MR. THAGGART: Both.

MR. ANTONIOU: Thank you.

MR. THAGGART: That's all for now, thanks.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: I have no questions on

VI-1 and VI-1(O), which leads us to VI-1(P). We

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On VI-1(R), we touched upon this issue very briefly earlier. This deals with the

1 references, and whether or not references to 2 documents within the Interconnection Agreement are static or dynamic. One other type of document which is incorporated in that provision is changes in, I think, law or Commission rules. Wouldn't that, at least that section of this provision, be covered by the change-in-law provision of the Interconnection Agreement? Let's start with Verizon.

MR. ANTONIOU: I'm not sure. What I mean by that is Verizon would like to ensure for better or worse to say if we benefit from a change, fine; if we don't benefit from it, fine. But whatever the law might be from time to time or whatever the reference might be from time to time be what applies.

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If there is a change--this may be more 18 responsive to your question. Let's say there are 19 new obligations that we have to undertake. 20∥those are straightforward in the sense they're not 21 operationally difficult or complicated to put in place, say we don't have to put in some sort of OSS

procedure we didn't have before, and if we really don't need to coordinate the change with the other party, if it's a matter of sort of being able to flip a switch and provide whatever it is we are required to provide, it seems to me I would like the change to flow through without the other carrier having to amend its contract in some way.

Alternatively, if it's something like the UNE Remand Order where we have entirely new UNEs, that, in fact, do have these sort of changes and/or coordination required, we need some meeting of the minds on what those changes are going to be.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: Your position is with regard to those two elements of this provision, that this provision is not repetitive of the change-of-law provision?

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MR. ANTONIOU: I think that's right.

MR. HARTHUN: To answer your question, I think the change-in-law provision obviates the need for this reference provision. The issue here is just how to reference certain things. And the contract is going to remain up to date with respect

1 to the applicable law through the change-in-law 2 process, which diminishes heavily the need to make 3 sure the references stay up to date because those 4 will automatically have been kept up to date 5 because of change in law.

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MR. FIRSCHEIN: I have one final question, 7 and that is one of the types of documents which is 8 incorporated or would be incorporated in this 9 provision are a number of documents which I can only refer to as internal documents of Verizon. Ι 11 think they referred to employee handbooks at one 12 point.

Verizon, in its testimony, states that in 14∥any changes to even any internal document, if I 15 understand this correctly, CLECs have an 16 opportunity to raise comments to those changes.

MR. ANTONIOU: I'm not sure of the particular reference, but I will try to give a 19 | quick thumbnail sketch of how we see this.

There are certain things that we all do 21 together in the telecommunications community that 22 are subject to collaboratives. There are certain

other procedures and actions that are subject to something like a changed management process, so clearly those are items we have common input and sort of arrived at a conclusion voluntarily.

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There are internal manuals we might have, methods and procedures about how it is that this person in our company prepares a draft and sends it to that person to look at for a bill. I don't think we are looking for any input on how it is that we internally give effect to the obligations that we have in the contracts.

By my recollection, there aren't many, any, of those sort of references in the contract, and maybe we should find all of them if you are concerned about it. But as a general matter, I can't think of anything in here that would give CLECs as far as internal documents they should concerned about, and they may have examples if they bring them up now or otherwise.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: How many and what types of these internal documents are actually referenced 22 within the Interconnection Agreement? And if that

1 | is something which you can't identify for us in 2 your posthearing briefs--

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MR. ANTONIOU: I could think of one that comes to mind: The quidelines that we would have for providing trunk forecasts. I can't think of any off the top of my head. Anybody else has one, please pipe in.

MR. HARTHUN: I don't have a sense right 9 now how often because all of these issues in these 10 | contract provisions are subject to arbitration 11 | right now. How many of them will reference--I think what you are referring to is the CLEC 13 | handbook, which is at three volume set right now, 14 internal documentation from Verizon.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: I'm working off of memory 16 here, but I seem to recall a reference to an 17 employee handbook, and that's a phrase used by Verizon, but I don't remember that.

MR. ANTONIOU: With respect to the CLEC 20 | handbook, I don't think there is anything in this 21 contract saying that the other carriers are bound 22 by what's in the CLEC handbook because I think they

1 would rightly say we don't have an opportunity 2 necessarily to change that. It's provided as a 3 guide to assist in particular in ordering so there $4 \parallel$ aren't mistakes, we don't want mistakes, but I don't think there is anything in here that says we 6 have to follow what that might be.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: So, this discussion may be 8 ∥as much theoretical as relevant as to how many of 9 these occurred within the Interconnection 10 Agreement.

If your post-hearings briefs if you could 12 just identify how many of these reference, the 13 different type of documents are and with regard to $14\parallel$ each type of document, whether or not CLECs have an 15 | opportunity to comment on any potential changes.

MR. ANTONIOU: Okay.

MR. FIRSCHEIN: Thank you.

MR. DYGERT: All right.

(Pause.)

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MR. DYGERT: Let's start with staff questions that may affect Dr. Collins.

> MS. DAILEY: This concerns issue I-9.

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My question, Dr. Collins, is: What 1 2 services does Cox provide to Verizon that are in 3 | issue I-9?

DR. COLLINS: There are jointly shared transport facilities, as an example. There may be 6∥situations where Cox, certain outside plant work 7 | for Verizon. It's things of that nature, as opposed to anything having to do with switching or things related to Cox's switch or Cox's exchange 10 | outside plant, absent interoffice trunking.

MS. DAILEY: Are all the services pursuant at issue provided pursuant to a tariff filed with 13 the Virginia Commission?

DR. COLLINS: Yes.

MS. DAILEY: Are these services referenced 15 16 in the Interconnection Agreement?

DR. COLLINS: I'm not sure they are 18 referenced in specific terms. I believe they are 19 referenced in general terms.

And also believe that there is a tariff 21 reference that is Cox's Virginia tariff is 22 referenced with respect to them.

MR. HARRINGTON: For clarification, the 2 pricing schedule at the end of the agreement does 3 contain language indicating that all other services Cox might provide are available, so they're 5 technically incorporated into the agreement in that regard.

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MS. DAILEY: I guess my question is, does issue I-9 with respect to Cox concern reciprocal 9 compensation rates?

DR. COLLINS: Not per se. The reciprocal compensation rates are "merit."

MS. DAILEY: Okay, but the services 13 provided that are addressed in issue I-9 are not 14 services subject to reciprocal compensation; is 15 that correct?

DR. COLLINS: The traffic which is subject 17 to reciprocal compensation could flow over as an 18 | example an entrance facility that Cox would provide 19∥to Verizon. So, I don't know if I can--in that 20 circumstance I don't know if I could say that there 21 is no effect of these tariff services on reciprocal 22 compensation. They're part of the--not the

1 reciprocal compensation rate but the total revenue 2 flow that results from the traffic which then gets applied to reciprocal compensation for the sole termination of that traffic. There may be other components.

MR. HARRINGTON: Is your question just as to the transport and termination rates?

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MS. DAILEY: My question has to deal with the services at issue in I-9, the CLEC services at 10 issue in I-9.

MR. HARRINGTON: Your question was: Are 12 the transport and termination rates reciprocal compensation subject to I-9? I'm not sure he $14 \parallel \text{understood}$ the question. That's why I'm asking.

MS. DAILEY: My question was: Are these 16 reciprocal compensation rates, or are these rates that are addressed in a tariff filed with the 18 Virginia Commission?

DR. COLLINS: With respect to what is 20 usually meant when someone says "reciprocal compensation," these are not part of the rates that 22 I-9 addresses.

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1	MS. DAILEY: Okay.
2	DR. COLLINS: But the rates which are
3	filed with the Virginia Commission are the rates
4	that I-9 addresses.
5	MS. DAILEY: Okay.
6	MR. DYGERT: Then WorldCom hasdoes Cox
7	have any redirect for Dr. Collins?
8	DR. COLLINS: No.
9	MR. DYGERT: He's free to go at this
10	point?
11	MR. HARRINGTON: Yes. Thank you.
12	DR. COLLINS: Thank you. Then WorldCom
13	does have
14	MS. MERIWEATHER: Yes, we have a few
15	questions for the Verizon witnesses.
16	MR. DYGERT: Mr. Harrington, do you want
17	to move the admission of your Exhibits 22 to 24 at
18	this point?
19	MR. HARRINGTON: Yes, I would like to.
20	MR. DYGERT: There is no objection to them
21	from Verizon?
22	MS. FAGLIONI: No objection.

1 MR. DYGERT: Great. Thank you. 2 (Cox Exhibit Nos. 22, 23 and 3 24 were admitted into 4 evidence.) 5 CROSS-EXAMINATION MS. MERIWEATHER: I have a few questions 6 7 for Mr. Daly and Mr. Pitterle with regard to issue 8 I I - 9. 9 Mr. Daly and Mr. Pitterle, you stated in ∥your testimony that was filed July 31st--that's 11 your direct testimony, and in this proceeding 12 that's been marked Verizon Exhibit 6, I 13 | believe--yes, Verizon Exhibit 7, on page six of 14 your testimony you state that the price cap that 15 | Verizon has proposed would apply when Verizon 16 purchases and use the phrase power and space to 17 | interconnect with a CLEC; is that correct? 18 MR. DALY: Do you have a line cite for 19 that? 20 MS. MERIWEATHER: Yes, I believe it's line 21 20 on page 7 of that testimony. 22 The question was: Why does Verizon

1 propose - - the question in the testimony is why does 2 | Verizon propose that the petitioners commit to just 3 and reasonable rates? And the answer at line 20 4 and then throughout the testimony--I'm just trying 5∥to draw your attention to the phrase--you referred 6 to power and space that Verizon would purchase.

MR. DALY: Yes, that's correct. $8 \parallel 20$ we are referring to power and space.

MS. MERIWEATHER: When you say "power and 10 | space, " are you referring to co-location space?

MR. DALY: It's in the context of 12 co-location.

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MS. MERIWEATHER: Now, isn't it true that 14∥a carrier's need to purchase co-location space will 15∥vary, depending on the co-location architecture, 16 interconnection architecture that's used?

MR. DALY: That's correct. If Verizon 18∥has--potentially, as a result of this particular 19∥proceeding, has the option, for instance, to bill 20∥facilities directly to WorldCom's switch site and 21 is financially responsible for delivering its 22 traffic, its originating traffic, to that switched

1|site, we will need the opportunity to co-locate our 2 equipment on the premises of the switched site, the 3 WorldCom switch site.

MS. MERIWEATHER: As I understand it, 5 there are some interconnection architectures that 6 would not require co-location; is that right?

MS. DAILEY: Can I--the co-location of || Verizon equipment?

> MS. MERIWEATHER: Yes.

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MR. DALY: That's correct. Verizon's VGRIP proposal is one example where it would not require the co-location of Verizon equipment.

MS. MERIWEATHER: Okay. And one other example is, as I understand it of interconnection 15∥architecture that would not require co-location and 16 would therefore not require the purchase of co-location space or power, as you used the phrase, is the joint mid-span fiber meet method; is that also correct?

MR. DALY: To the best of my knowledge, yes, that's correct.

MS. MERIWEATHER: I have no further

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MR. DYGERT: No redirect from Verizon?

MS. FAGLIONI: No redirect.

MR. ANTONIOU: No chuckles about South Carolina or Georgia either on VGRIP.

MS. DAILEY: Does WorldCom--does Verizon currently co-locate at a WorldCom facility for purposes of delivery traffic?

MR. DALY: I'm not aware of any for the purposes of delivery of originating local traffic. I couldn't speak--there is the context, if you will, of originating access traffic, for instance, in the interexchange carrier world.

MS. DAILEY: We are not talking about interexchange.

So, if I understood what you just said,
Verizon does not currently co-locate at a WorldCom
facility in Virginia for local exchange traffic?

MR. DALY: To the best of my knowledge, that's true.

To follow up to that, I assumed based on that fact that Verizon has other alternatives in

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1 terms of how it's delivering originating traffic to 2 WorldCom, whether it might be leasing, direct trunk transport from WorldCom, or perhaps handing it off to WorldCom at one of WorldCom's co-location sites, or some other mutually agreed-to location.

MS. DAILEY: This is just a practical question. Is this a real--is this something that's happening? I guess my question is: Do the 9 petitioners currently provide services to Verizon 10∥that implicate this issue, or is this a theoretical 11 issue?

MR. DALY: The petitioners--and I 13 can't--the petitioners are in a position--yes, the 14 answer to your question is yes. Petitioners offer 15∥us today and in some cases we buy dedicated 16∥transport from the petitioners for the delivery of 17∥our traffic.

Is that priced pursuant to a MS. DAILEY: 19∥tariff that's filed at the Virginia Commission for 20∥services in Virginia?

21 MR. DALY: I don't know that to be the case. I just don't know. To answer the question

1	would be speculation on my part.
2	MS. DAILEY: We got an answer from Cox.
3	WorldCom?
4	MR. ARGENBRIGHT: Yes, WorldCom has a
5	tariff for those facilities.
6	MS. DAILEY: And AT&T?
7	MR. CEDERQVIST: Yes.
8	MS. DAILEY: Okay.
9	MR. DYGERT: Lunch.
10	(Whereupon, at 2:09 p.m., the hearing was
11	adjourned until 2:50 p.m., the same day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

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MR. DYGERT: All right. During the break $3 \parallel$ we agreed to a few more scheduling changes. 4 propose to indicate those by listing only the 5 issues that we are going to get through this 6 afternoon with the understanding that everything else has either been put off or tentatively settled $8 \parallel by$ the parties.

But Mr. Keffer, you wanted to put 10 something else on the record?

MR. KEFFER: Only that it's our 12∥understanding that Verizon's witness for issues 13 \parallel I-11 and I-8, who was going to be available by 14 telephone this afternoon, now turns out will not be AT&T and, I believe, Cox only had 15 available. 16 cross-examination on those issues today as their 17∥only remaining items.

So, if the Verizon witness is going to be 19∥moved to next week, we are done for this week, and 20 we will excuse ourselves from the proceeding, with 21 your permission. All that I would ask is we 22 | identify when next week the Verizon witness be here

1 for cross on those issues.

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MR. KEHOE: Jeff, do I understand from what you said that AT&T and Verizon have resolved issue III-13, the rights-of-way issue?

> That is correct. MR. KEFFER:

MR. KEHOE: It is resolved, thank you.

MR. DYGERT: And Verizon is going to let the parties know when that witness is available next week?

MS. FAGLIONI: I think we talked about |doing it on Thursday, and if we wanted to pick a specific time, if it made sense, that we would do it first up 9:30, if that fits in with where we are next week.

MR. HARRINGTON: That's fine with Cox.

16 MS. KELLEY: My witness tells me she's not 17∥available until 10.

MS. FAGLIONI: Any time Thursday is fine.

MR. DYGERT: We will plan on doing those 20∥issues either at 9:30 or shortly thereafter--at 10, approximately. How is that?

> MR. HARRINGTON: That's perfectly

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